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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge.  
This case arises out of a dispute under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Under the IDEA, 
when parents and school districts dispute a child’s 
educational placement, a parent may file an administrative 
due process complaint that can lead to an administrative 
hearing. At least ten days before the dispute reaches a 
hearing, the school district can extend a settlement offer to the 
parent, referred to herein as a “ten-day offer.” If the matter 
proceeds to a hearing and the parent is the prevailing party, 
this ten-day offer becomes significant. A parent who is the 
prevailing party may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees 
under the IDEA, but the ten-day offer allows a school district 
to limit its exposure to such fees by limiting a parent’s 
eligibility for attorney’s fees to only those fees accrued before 
the time of the ten-day offer. If a parent rejects the ten-day 
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offer, the parent may only receive attorney’s fees for work 
done after the time of the offer if (1) the hearing leads to more 
favorable relief than the offer included, or (2) the parent was 
substantially justified in rejecting the offer. 
In the instant matter, Rena C., mother to student A.D., 
filed an administrative due process complaint against the 
Colonial School District to determine an appropriate 
placement for her daughter. In an effort to limit the accrual of 
owed attorney’s fees, Colonial extended Rena C. what it 
contends was a ten-day offer.  Rena C. rejected the offer. 
When the matter eventually proceeded to a hearing, an 
administrative officer entered an order in favor of Rena C., 
ordering a private school placement for the student. As the 
prevailing party, Rena C. then filed a claim for attorney’s fees 
in the District Court. This appeal concerns whether or not 
Colonial successfully limited Rena C.’s eligibility for 
attorney’s fees with its offer. Because Rena C. was the 
prevailing party, the District Court awarded her attorney’s 
fees for work performed prior to the ten-day offer. However, 
the District Court held that because she did not receive more 
favorable relief and was not substantially justified in rejecting 
the offer, she was not entitled to fees accrued after Colonial’s 
offer. We disagree and hold that Rena C. was substantially 
justified in rejecting Colonial School District’s offer. We will 
reverse and remand to the District Court for recalculation of 
attorney’s fees.  
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I. 
Rena C.’s child, A.D., attended public school in the 
Colonial School District. The instant matter was not the first 
placement dispute between Rena C. and Colonial. Prior to this 
matter, when A.D. was entering seventh grade, Rena C. 
unilaterally pulled A.D. from the public school she had been 
attending and enrolled her at the Stratford Friends School. 
Rena C. claimed that Colonial had failed to provide a free, 
appropriate public education as required by the IDEA and 
sought reimbursement from Colonial. The matter went to an 
administrative hearing officer who found that A.D.’s 
Individualized Education Program (IEP) at Colonial was 
inappropriate and that the placement at Stratford was 
appropriate. The hearing officer awarded Rena C. two years 
of compensatory education, tuition reimbursement for the 
current school year, and ongoing tuition reimbursement until 
Colonial convened an appropriate IEP meeting.  
 The following school year, for A.D.’s eighth grade 
year, Rena C. again enrolled her at Stratford. Colonial 
convened an IEP meeting at the end of that school year. Rena 
C. disputed the adequacy of the IEP and requested mediation, 
thus beginning the dispute underlying this appeal. At the end 
of the summer, Rena C. notified Colonial that she intended to 
enroll A.D. at Delaware Valley Friends School for the next 
school year and requested reimbursement for tuition and 
related expenses. Colonial responded that the new IEP 
placing A.D. at the public school was adequate and that it 
therefore was not required to further reimburse Rena C. for 
any educational expenses. Rena C. then cancelled the 
mediation she had requested and filed an administrative 
complaint challenging the adequacy of the IEP. She sought 
declaratory relief and “reimbursement for private tuition and 
associated costs (‘tuition reimbursement’) arising from 
 6 
[A.D.]’s private placements for the [previous] school year and 
the [upcoming] school year.” App. 45.  Rena C. received a 
tuition bill from Delaware Valley on the same day she filed 
her administrative complaint. The invoice shows two separate 
educational expenses: $36,300 for tuition and $10,800 for 
one-on-one educational support.  
 On September 18, 2014, Colonial sent Rena C. what 
it contends was a ten-day offer pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I)-(III). In this letter, Colonial offered “to 
pay private school tuition and transportation for Parent’s 
unilateral placement at Delaware Valley Friends School.” 
App. 49. Rena C. did not respond to this letter for over a 
month. She eventually claimed that it did not constitute a 
valid offer because it lacked school board approval, and that it 
was inadequate for failing to address attorney’s fees or 
pendency.1  
 The parties attempted negotiation, but eventually 
proceeded to an administrative hearing. After the first session 
of the hearing concluded, the parties participated in mediation 
with the assistance of a secondary administrative hearing 
officer. Subsequently, the parties stipulated to a consent order 
entered by an administrative hearing officer providing for 
tuition, one-on-one instructional support, transportation 
reimbursement, and pendency at Delaware Valley. The order 
did not include attorney’s fees. 
 Rena C. filed a complaint in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking approximately $70,000 in attorney’s 
fees under the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Colonial 
                                            
1 Under the IDEA, pendency refers to the educational 
placement in which a student has the right to “stay-put” 
during a placement dispute.  
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counterclaimed for attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) and (III), alleging that Rena C. continued 
to litigate after the litigation had become frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation, thereby needlessly 
increasing the cost of litigation.  
The District Court granted Rena C.’s motion for 
summary judgment on her claim for attorney’s fees, but 
awarded her only $7,438.00. This figure included only those 
attorney’s fees accrued before the school district made its ten-
day offer. She was not awarded any fees accrued after the 
school district made its ten-day offer because the court found 
that she did not receive more favorable relief during the 
subsequent proceedings, and that she was not substantially 
justified in rejecting the offer. The District Court granted in 
part and denied in part Colonial’s motion for summary 
judgment, rejecting its argument that the school district was a 
prevailing party, but agreeing that Rena C. was not entitled to 
fees for post-offer work. The District Court rejected 
Colonial’s counterclaim because Colonial was not the 
prevailing party.2 
                                            
2 The order filed by the District Court in response to 
Rena C.’s motion for summary judgment on Colonial’s 
counterclaim says that the motion was denied, but the opinion 
of the District Court makes clear that the court held that 
Colonial could not receive fees because it was not a 
prevailing party. Therefore, we regard the order as a clerical 
error and regard the opinion as disposing of Colonial’s 
counterclaim.  
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II.  
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. This Court exercises jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We apply plenary review to legal 
questions related to the interpretation of ten-day offers and to 
questions of construction regarding such offers under the 
IDEA. This standard is consistent with this Court’s standard 
of review for rulings on attorney’s fees, and with its standard 
of review for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offers of 
judgment. See M.R. v. Ridley School District (Ridley II), 868 
F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Although ordinarily we review 
attorneys’ fees rulings for abuse of discretion, our review is 
plenary where, as here, the district court based its denial on 
legal conclusions.”); Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 
F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 2003) (exercising “plenary review over 
both legal questions regarding the interpretation of Rule 68 
and the construction of the offer of judgment”).  
III. 
 Rena C. makes five alternative arguments on appeal as 
to why she is entitled to recover attorney’s fees accrued after 
Colonial’s September 18, 2014 offer. First, she argues that 
Colonial did not make a valid offer of settlement pursuant to 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). We conclude that it did. Second, 
she argues that she received more favorable relief in the 
administrative order than Colonial had included in the ten-day 
offer. We conclude that she did not. Third, she argues that she 
was substantially justified in rejecting the offer. We agree. 
Fourth, she argues that she was entitled to fees under the 
ADA and § 504 even if she was precluded under the IDEA, 
and fifth, she argues that she was separately entitled to fees 
for her defense of Colonial’s counterclaim. We decline to 
reach these issues. Because the IDEA did not preclude fees, 
we need not address these alternative statutory arguments.  
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A) Colonial School District made a valid offer of 
settlement pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415.  
 
Rena C. argues that Colonial did not make a valid ten-
day offer because the school board had not yet approved it. 
Neither Pennsylvania law nor the IDEA, however, required 
Colonial to secure school board approval prior to extending a 
ten-day offer of settlement under 20 U.S.C. § 1415. 
Pennsylvania law requires the affirmative vote of the majority 
of the members of a board of school directors to take any 
action, inter alia, “[c]reating or increasing any indebtedness” 
or “[e]ntering into contracts of any kind, including contracts 
for the purchase of fuel or any supplies, where the amount 
involved exceeds one hundred dollars ($100).” 24 P.S. § 5-
508. This state statute might require school board approval 
before a completed settlement agreement for more than one 
hundred dollars can be enforced, but the text of the provision 
lacks any indication that it prohibits school boards from doing 
what Colonial did here: authorizing an agent, such as an 
attorney, to negotiate a contract on its behalf. And Rena C. 
points to no cases applying § 5-508 to IDEA ten-day offers. 
On its face, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) requires only that 
the ten-day offer be a “written offer of settlement.” Colonial’s 
offer to Rena C. was exactly that—an offer of settlement in 
writing.  
The IDEA has been interpreted to promote the speedy 
resolution of disputes between parents and school districts. El 
Paso Independent Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 591 F.3d 417, 426 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“Early resolution through settlement is 
favored under the IDEA.”). Interpreting § 5-508 to require 
school board approval before a ten-day offer could be valid 
under the IDEA would undermine the IDEA’s goal of 
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promoting speedy resolutions of placement disputes. The 
broad terms of the IDEA provide a framework that is flexible 
enough to apply to a multitude of different jurisdictions and 
school districts, each with its own policies and procedures. 
The clear wording of the IDEA requires only a “written offer 
of settlement” and § 5-508 does not provide a basis for 
requiring Colonial to have done more in order to make a valid 
ten-day offer satisfying the IDEA. We therefore hold that 
Colonial made a valid ten-day offer under the IDEA to Rena 
C.  
B) Rena C. did not receive more favorable relief in the 
administrative officer’s order than she had been 
offered in Colonial’s ten-day offer.  
 
The IDEA provides for an award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing party who is the parent of a 
child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). 
However, a parent may not receive attorney’s fees “for 
services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer 
of settlement to a parent” if: (1) the offer is made more than 
ten days before the proceeding begins; (2) the offer is not 
accepted within ten days; and (3) the court or administrative 
hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the 
parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of 
settlement.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).  
Colonial provided the settlement offer more than ten 
days before the proceeding began. Rena C. never sent any 
response, thereby rejecting the offer. The District Court found 
that the relief ultimately obtained by Rena C. was not more 
favorable than the settlement offer. We agree, finding that the 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) bar applies. 
Rena C.’s administrative complaint requested two 
items of relief. First, she sought “reimbursement for private 
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tuition and associated costs (tuition reimbursement)” for two 
school years. App. 43. Second, she requested declaratory 
relief in the form of an adjudication that her child’s rights 
under the IDEA, the ADA, and § 504 had been violated. In its 
ten-day offer, Colonial offered “to pay private school tuition 
and transportation for Parent’s unilateral placement at 
Delaware Valley Friends School.” App. 49. The 
administrative officer’s order provided for tuition, one-on-one 
instructional support, transportation reimbursement, and 
pendency at Delaware Valley. 
Rena C. argues that the explicit inclusion of one-on-
one instruction and pendency rendered the final order more 
favorable than the ten-day offer. This is incorrect because the 
terms of the ten-day offer already included these items.  
1. Colonial’s offer to pay tuition included the 
cost of one-on-one instruction.  
 
Although the administrative officer’s order explicitly 
indicated that one-on-one instruction was included (while the 
ten-day offer did not), the enumeration of this item did not 
constitute more favorable relief. The District Court correctly 
concluded that Colonial’s offer to pay tuition necessarily 
included an offer to pay for one-on-one instruction. 
 Rena C.’s due process complaint sought 
“reimbursement for private tuition and associated costs 
(‘tuition reimbursement’) arising from [student’s] private 
placements for the 2013-2014 school year and the 2014-2015 
school year.” App. 45. On the same day that she filed her 
complaint, Delaware Valley sent an invoice to Rena C for the 
“2014-2015 Tuition for A.D.” containing two line items: 
$36,300 for tuition and $10,800 for “Language Arts One-on-
One” for a total due of $47,100. Rena C. did not share this 
invoice with Colonial before the ten-day offer letter was sent.  
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The ten-day offer letter offered “private school tuition and 
transportation.” App. 49. The District Court correctly 
concluded that Colonial offered to pay the tuition bill from 
Delaware Valley for the 2014-2015 school year, which 
necessarily included the one-on-one instruction.  
 Colonial cannot be penalized for not specifically 
including the cost of one-on-one instruction when Rena C. 
never informed Colonial that this charge was annotated 
separately as part of Delaware Valley’s tuition invoice. 
Merriam-Webster defines “tuition” as “the price of or 
payment for instruction.” Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, 2461 (1993).  The Random House Dictionary 
defines tuition as “the charge or fee for instruction as at a 
private school or a college or university.” Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language, 2034 (2d Ed. 1987). 
Based on the language contained in Rena C.’s complaint and 
the dictionary definitions, Colonial’s offer to pay “private 
school tuition” included the cost of one-on-one instruction. 
When the hearing officer ordered Colonial to “pay private 
school tuition” and specified that tuition included one-on-one 
instruction, the hearing officer did not provide greater relief 
than Colonial’s ten-day offer to “pay private school tuition.” 
The hearing officer simply knew the additional fact that the 
one-on-one instruction was a separately annotated cost in the 
bill for tuition. 
 Rena C. argues that it was ambiguous whether one-on-
one instruction was included in Colonial’s offer and that this 
ambiguity should have been construed against Colonial, both 
because Colonial was the drafter, and because Colonial was 
the moving party at the summary judgment stage. Rena C. is 
correct that any ambiguity would have been construed against 
Colonial had she agreed to the offer and then Colonial refused 
to pay. However, this is not a contract enforcement case. 
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Rena C. cannot inject ambiguity into a clear offer to pay 
private school tuition by withholding information about the 
particular billing conventions of the private school. Had Rena 
C. been unsure whether Colonial’s offer included the cost of 
one-on-one instruction, she could have clarified with them. 
Unlike Rule 68 offers of judgment, IDEA ten-day offers are 
not required to be non-negotiable. Ten-day offers may be 
clarified by parents. See Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High 
Sch. Dist., 816 F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 2016).  
Additionally, Rena C.’s contention that the District 
Court erred in applying the summary judgment standard by 
not resolving the issue of whether one-on-one instruction was 
included in tuition in Rena C.’s favor fails. Whether “tuition” 
in the ten-day offer included the cost of one-on-one-
instruction is a legal question regarding the construction of 
the offer, not a factual question that should be resolved in 
favor of the nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage. 
2. Colonial’s offer to pay tuition at a private 
school placement would have created pendency 
at the private school and triggered the student’s 
“stay-put” rights at the private school.  
  
Pendency refers to a student’s rights under the IDEA 
to “stay-put” in the current educational placement. The “stay-
put” provision requires that “during the pendency of any 
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the 
State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise 
agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational 
placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). This requires 
the school district to continue to pay for the “then-current 
educational placement” during the pendency of proceedings 
resolving placement disputes. Drinker by Drinker v. Colonial 
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Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 865 (3d Cir. 1996).  
The ten-day offer did not mention pendency explicitly, 
but the subsequent administrative order included the 
statement that “[b]y the parties’ agreement, pendency shall be 
at Delaware Valley Friends School.” App. 127. Rena C. 
contends that this sentence provided more favorable relief 
than ten-day offer. Colonial contends that although the ten-
day offer letter did not specifically state that pendency would 
attach at Delaware Valley, pendency would have attached had 
Rena C. accepted their offer because Delaware Valley would 
have automatically become A.D.’s “then-current placement.”  
 This issue turns on whether Rena C.’s acceptance of 
the ten-day offer would have made Delaware Valley A.D.’s 
“then-current educational placement,” vesting her with “stay-
put” rights should any dispute over placement arise in the 
future. This Court has held that “[b]ecause [then-current] 
connotes preservation of the status quo, it refers to the 
operative placement actually functioning at the time the 
dispute first arises.” Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (quoting Thomas 
v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625–26 (6th Cir. 
1990)). Under this Court’s precedent, “the dispositive factor 
in deciding a child’s ‘current educational placement’ should 
be the Individualized Education Program (‘IEP’) actually 
functioning when the ‘stay put’ is invoked.” Drinker, 78 F.3d 
at 867 (citation omitted).  
This provision “reflect[s] Congress’s conclusion that a 
child with a disability is best served by maintaining her 
educational status quo until the disagreement over her IEP is 
resolved.” M.R. v. Ridley School Dist. (Ridley I), 744 F.3d 
112, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). A student’s “operative placement 
could be either a public school or a private school that the 
local district was financing to satisfy the requirement that 
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every child be given a free, appropriate education.” Id.  
“Stay-put” rights do not attach when a parent 
unilaterally moves a child to a new placement. However, 
“[t]he new placement can become the educational setting 
protected by the “stay-put” rule if the parents and ‘the State or 
local educational agency’ agree to the change.” Id. at 118–19. 
The State is considered to have agreed to the change when an 
administrative review process yields a decision approving of 
the parent’s unilateral placement. Id. at 119. Once an 
administrative ruling validates the parents’ decision to move 
the child to a new placement, “the move to private school is 
no longer the parents’ unilateral action, and the child is 
entitled to ‘stay put’ at the private school for the duration of 
the dispute resolution proceedings.” Id. 
This Court has not squarely addressed whether a 
school district’s private agreement to pay for a parent’s 
unilateral private school placement constitutes an agreement 
to the placement. We now hold that by agreeing, without 
limitations, to pay tuition at a private school, the school 
district, as the local educational agency, agrees that the 
private school placement is appropriate and that paying 
tuition there fulfills its obligation to provide a free and 
appropriate public education. When parents and a local 
educational agency agree on a placement without limitations, 
that placement becomes the educational setting protected by 
the “stay-put” provision of 20 U.S.C. 1415(j). Had Rena C. 
accepted Colonial’s offer, A.D.’s “stay-put” rights would 
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have attached at Delaware Valley.3 
Rena C. argues that the District Court’s conclusion that 
“stay-put” rights would attach was not supported by law 
because a school district’s financial responsibility for a 
student’s placement is not equivalent to agreement by the 
district to the placement. To support this argument, Rena C. 
cites Lauren W. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 02-4775, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18303, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2002) and K.L. v. Berlin 
Borough Bd. of Educ., No. 13-4215, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111047 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2013). Neither of these cases is 
controlling and neither addresses the scenario presented in 
                                            
3 We recognize that our law regarding implied 
pendency in ten-day offers was not settled during the events 
giving rise to this litigation. Rena C. argued that she had a 
good faith basis for declining Colonial’s offer, and other 
courts have held that good faith arguments can qualify as 
substantial justification for rejecting ten-day offers under the 
IDEA. See B.L. v. District of Columbia, 517 F. Supp. 2d 57, 
61 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding parents substantially justified in 
rejecting an offer that did not include expert costs because, at 
the time of the offer, “it was by no means settled law that 
expert costs could not be recovered” and only an intervening 
Supreme Court decision had made clear that the parents’ 
rejection lacked legal basis); R.N. v. Suffield Bd. of Educ., 194 
F.R.D. 49, 53 (D. Conn. 2000) (holding parents’ rejection 
substantially justified because they were acting based on split 
of authority within district). However, as we will explain 
below, we conclude here that Rena C. was substantially 
justified in rejecting Colonial’s offer for a different reason: 
because it did not include attorney’s fees. Thus, we need not 
reach the issue of whether a good faith argument rooted in 
unsettled law can qualify as substantial justification. 
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this case.  
In Lauren W., the settlement specifically stipulated that 
pendency would not attach to the parents’ unilateral school 
placement. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18303 at *9. However, 
once the school board voted to pay for tuition at that 
placement beyond the terms of the settlement, pendency did 
attach. Id. at *10. In K.L., again, the settlement stipulated that 
the question of pendency was still disputed by the parties and 
was unaffected by the agreement. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111047 at *12–13. The district court there concluded that the 
settlement agreement only pertained to reimbursement and 
did not constitute an agreement on appropriate placement. Id. 
Unlike those cases, Colonial’s offer here included no specific 
limitations on pendency.  
 Without any limitations attached, a school district’s 
agreement to pay for private school tuition constitutes an 
agreement to placement and triggers the student’s “stay-put” 
rights. For this reason, the explicit inclusion of pendency in 
the order does not create a more favorable outcome than the 
ten-day offer.  
 Rena C. did not receive more favorable relief in the 
final order than she was offered by Colonial in the ten-day 
offer. The bar of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) therefore 
applies and she is prevented from receiving attorney’s fees 
“for services performed subsequent to the time of a written 
offer of settlement,” unless she was substantially justified in 
rejecting Colonial’s offer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i); see 
id. § 1415(i)(3)(E). 
C) Rena C. was substantially justified in rejecting 
Colonial’s ten-day offer letter. 
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E), Rena C. may still be 
eligible for post-offer attorney’s fees, even though she did not 
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receive more favorable relief, if she was substantially justified 
in rejecting Colonial’s ten-day offer. Rena C. identifies three 
reasons why she was substantially justified in rejecting the 
ten-day offer. First, the offer did not include attorney’s fees 
and costs. Second, the offer was vague. Third, she had a good 
faith basis for believing that the offer did not include the cost 
of one-on-one instruction, pendency, or attorney’s fees and 
costs. The District Court rejected these three arguments, 
concluding that she was not substantially justified in rejecting 
the offer. We hold that the absence of attorney’s fees 
provided Rena C. with substantial justification for rejecting 
the offer. Given that holding, we will not reach her vagueness 
or good faith arguments.  
The Third Circuit, like most other circuits, has not 
defined the standard for determining whether a parent was 
substantially justified under the IDEA in rejecting a 
settlement offer. See Beauchamp, 816 F.3d at 1222 (“There is 
little precedent interpreting the phrase ‘substantially 
justified’”). Case law from district courts and at least one 
circuit court offers a somewhat scattered picture in the 
context of attorney’s fees. 
1. Attorney’s fees are relevant to the ten-day 
offer. 
The IDEA does not require a school district to include 
attorney’s fees in ten-day offers to parents. To obtain 
attorney’s fees in court, parents must be the prevailing party 
with a judgment on the merits, or a court-ordered consent 
decree that creates a “material alteration of the legal 
relationship.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. 
Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 
(2001).  
Colonial argues that attorney’s fees, as a collateral 
 19 
matter, are irrelevant in the context of a ten-day offer because 
they are not part of the available relief for parents at an 
administrative hearing. This argument ignores the fact that 
relief granted at an administrative hearing creates the 
condition necessary for parents to seek attorney’s fees. 
Without pursuing the administrative hearing, a parent cannot 
achieve the prevailing party status necessary to claim 
attorney’s fees. See id.; P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 
F.3d 848, 855–857 (3d Cir. 2006). The District Court 
correctly disposed of this argument by recognizing that had 
Rena C. accepted the ten-day offer, the parties would have 
created a non-judicially sanctioned agreement, and neither 
party would be considered the prevailing party, so Rena C. 
would have no path to recover attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees 
are therefore relevant to a ten-day offer. 
2. Colonial’s offer did not include attorney’s 
fees.  
The District Court found that the ten-day offer 
included an offer to pay attorney’s fees, so Rena C. was not 
substantially justified in rejecting the offer. The letter stated: 
“This offer does not imply that the School District 
acknowledges any liability in this matter whatsoever; rather, 
it is an attempt to achieve an amicable resolution. This offer 
is also being made in order to further limit the School 
District’s possible prevailing party attorney fee liability.” 
App. 49. The District Court held that, because “Colonial 
explained it was making the offer to ‘further limit’ exposure 
to attorney’s fees, [it] implicitly acknolwedg[ed] it would pay 
attorney’s fees incurred to date.” App. 20. 
In interpreting this offer, we must focus on its plain 
language. See Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t., 658 F.3d 324, 
331 (3d Cir. 2011). The plain language does not indicate that 
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Colonial offered to pay any amount of attorney’s fees, but 
rather that it wished to avoid them. The District Court erred 
because the language of the offer makes clear that Colonial 
believed its liability for attorney’s fees would only arise if 
Rena C. were the prevailing party. Had Rena C. accepted the 
offer, she would not be the prevailing party. For this reason, 
the District Court erred in concluding that the ten-day offer 
letter included attorney’s fees. Had Colonial intended to 
include attorney’s fees in its offer, it had the burden to state 
that the offer included payment of attorney’s fees accrued up 
until that point. See id. (holding that the district court erred in 
concluding that Rule 68 offer of judgment included attorney’s 
fees because the offer “did not explicitly include attorney’s 
fees or costs).4  
3. A ten-day offer that affords no attorney’s 
fees provides a parent with substantial 
justification to reject the offer when the 
school district could not rationally believe 
that attorney’s fees had not accrued. 
 
The IDEA provides for attorney’s fees so that parents 
may seek assistance when necessary to protect their child’s 
right to a free, appropriate public education. Ten-day offer 
letters should not permit school boards to force parents to 
choose between securing an appropriate placement for their 
child and obtaining the attorney’s fees to which they would 
                                            
4 Additionally, the District Court erred in considering 
that after the ten-day offer had lapsed, Colonial made a 
separate, explicit offer to pay reasonable attorney’s fees 
because that evidence is extrinsic and cannot be used to 
interpret the offer.  
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otherwise be statutorily entitled. 
There is no controlling case law in this Circuit 
regarding whether or not the absence of attorney’s fees 
provides substantial justification for rejecting a ten-day offer. 
There is varied case law among the district courts and the 
Fifth Circuit regarding this question. 
The District Court for the District of Columbia 
provided compelling reasoning in Daniel v. District of 
Columbia for considering the absence of attorney’s fees in an 
offer as substantial justification for rejection by the parents. 
174 F. Supp. 3d 532, 546 (D.D.C. 2016). There, the court 
explained that “[p]arents or guardians of children with special 
needs should not have to choose between a District offer of 
special education services for those children on the one hand, 
and continuing to pursue litigation so that their counsel who 
caused DCPS to make the offer in the first place may obtain 
some measure of reasonable compensation.” Id. The court in 
Daniel reasoned that the school district could not rationally 
believe that the parents had not accrued attorney’s fees before 
the time of its offer. Id. at 545. In another case, the same 
district court stated that “Congress included the [IDEA] fee-
shifting provision so that all children and their families would 
be able to enforce the child’s right to a free and appropriate 
public education, regardless of financial means.” Garvin v. 
Gov’t of D.C., 910 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D.D.C. 2012). In 
Dicks v. District of Columbia, the court found parents 
substantially justified in rejecting an offer that only included 
attorney’s fees for 1.2 hours when the attorney had worked 
approximately 33 hours. 109 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (D.D.C. 
2015) (“A settlement offer that compensates counsel for a 
mere fraction [of] its efforts deters parents from exercising 
their due process rights and, as such, is inimical to the 
IDEA’s purpose.”).  
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In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the absence of 
attorney’s fees in a settlement offer did not substantially 
justify the parent’s rejection. Gary G. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 632 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2011). The offer in that 
case had been extended to the parent before the parent filed a 
due process complaint, and before the school district learned 
that the parent was represented by an attorney. Though the 
attorney in that case had recorded 13.8 hours of work through 
the date of the settlement offer, the school district was not 
even aware of the due process complaint, let alone the 
attorney’s involvement when it extended a written settlement 
offer. Id. at 204. On those facts, the court held that because 
the amount of fees claimed was so low, their omission did not 
establish substantial justification to reject the offer. The court 
there noted that it did “not hold that every plaintiff rejecting a 
settlement offer because it does not include such fees is, per 
se, not substantially justified in rejecting it.” Id. Rena C.’s 
case can be distinguished from Gary G. because here the due 
process complaint had been filed and Colonial certainly knew 
that an attorney was involved and that attorney’s fees had 
accrued when it extended its ten-day offer. 
This Circuit has recognized that “the IDEA’s 
legislative history reflects that Congress enacted the 
attorney’s fees provision specifically to ensure ‘that due 
process procedures, including the right to litigation if that 
becomes necessary, are available to all parents.’” Ridley II, 
868 F.3d at 227 (alterations omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-
112, at 2 (1985)). The ten-day offer provision in the IDEA 
facilitates efficient resolutions of disputes between parents 
and school districts over placement and seeks to obviate the 
need for a due process hearing. Still, the ten-day offer is often 
extended after a parent has hired an attorney to assist them in 
asserting their child’s rights.  
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We do not read the IDEA to force parents to decide 
between the resolution of a placement dispute and paying for 
the attorney who assisted in achieving an appropriate 
placement for the student. A school district seeking to settle a 
dispute in which a lawyer has been involved should 
acknowledge that the parent has accrued attorney’s fees and 
should clearly state if its offer includes the payment of any 
fees. A parent is substantially justified in rejecting an offer 
that does not include the payment of reasonable attorney’s 
fees when the school district cannot reasonably believe that 
no attorney’s fees have accrued.  
Because she was substantially justified in rejecting 
Colonial’s offer, Rena C. is eligible for attorney’s fees 
accrued after Colonial’s ten-day offer. We therefore will 
remand to the District Court for recalculation of attorney’s 
fees. 
D) We do not address Rena C.’s remaining arguments.  
Rena C. argued that even if the IDEA precluded her 
from receiving attorney’s fees, she would be entitled to fees 
under the ADA and § 504, and that the school district’s 
counterclaim provided a separate ground for an award of 
attorney’s fees. Because we hold that the IDEA does not 
preclude her from receiving attorney’s fees for work done 
after the ten-day offer, we do not reach the arguments for 
these alternative grounds for fees. 
IV. 
We will reverse and remand to the District Court for 
calculation of reasonable attorney’s fees in accord with 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) and consistent with this Court’s 
holding that Rena C. was substantially justified in rejecting 
the ten-day offer under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E). 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I agree that Rena C. was substantially justified in 
rejecting Colonial’s offer because the offer did not include the 
payment of attorney’s fees, and I join the majority opinion in 
full.  I write separately to briefly discuss the difficulties certain 
kinds of ten-day offers can create for school districts, parents, 
and, ultimately, courts.   
 This case is illustrative of those difficulties because it 
requires us to interpret what is a short and, in my view, 
amorphous offer.  The entire substance of the offer is contained 
in two sentences: “This offer is also being made in order to 
further limit the School District’s possible prevailing party 
attorney fee attorney liability.  The School District offers to pay 
private school tuition and transportation for Parent’s unilateral 
placement at Delaware Valley Friends School (‘DVFS’).”  JA 
49.  Colonial asked this Court to conclude that the offer’s two 
sentences contained a number of implicit terms: pendency at 
DVFS and reimbursement for both one-one-one language arts 
instruction and attorney’s fees.  As the majority opinion 
explains, we agreed with Colonial regarding pendency and 
one-on-one instruction, but could not conclude that the terms 
of the offer implied that Colonial would pay the attorney’s fees 
Rena C. had incurred up to that point.   
 I found the question regarding one-on-one instruction to 
be particularly challenging, both because the question of what 
falls within the ambit of tuition seems to me vague and 
indeterminate, and because the record here reveals little about 
the nature of the one-on-one services A.D. receives at DVFS.  
It merely indicates that DVFS provides her with a one-on-one 
instructor for the subject of language arts.   
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 In deciding to join the majority opinion’s conclusion 
that Colonial’s offer to pay “private school tuition” included 
an offer to pay for this one-on-one instruction, I found it 
significant that Colonial’s offer was unqualified.  It did not, for 
example, say “base tuition” or “tuition only and no other cost 
or fee.”  As the majority opinion also notes, Colonial did not 
know that one-on-one instruction would be listed separately on 
the DVFS tuition invoice, so it had no reason to offer it 
expressly.  Ultimately, I concluded that the record, though 
certainly far from comprehensive, provides enough 
information for us to infer confidently that the one-on-one 
instruction A.D. receives at DVFS is the kind of substantive 
curricular service that a school district like Colonial would 
generally consider to be within the ambit of a “tuition” 
payment.   
 
 It bears emphasis, however, that the majority opinion 
takes no position on whether countless other types of 
supplementary educational services would be included in an 
offer to pay “tuition.”  The opinion does not answer, for 
example, the question of whether a one-on-one aide who 
accompanies a student for assistance throughout the school 
day, but does not themself provide instruction, would be 
included.  Nor does it determine whether physical therapy 
services, speech and language therapy services, or 
occupational therapy services would be included.  Given the 
scarcity of information in the record here, I do not think this 
Court is well-positioned to provide much guidance regarding 
these questions.   
 
 I therefore would caution parties not to needlessly 
proceed to federal court based on the belief that our opinion 
here dictates the outcome in some future case involving some 
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other kind of educational service or instruction.  Instead, I 
would suggest that parties in the future be clear and specific 
when crafting and discussing ten-day offers.  School districts 
should be precise about what they are offering.  Parents should 
be forthcoming about the services they are seeking or 
anticipate receiving for their children.  And both school 
districts and parents should communicate throughout this 
process.  As the majority opinion correctly notes, ten-day 
offers need not be non-negotiable.  I understand that these 
cases can be deeply personal, and I am under no illusion that 
parties will always be on the best of terms, but litigants must 
prioritize the children at the heart of these disputes.   
 
 A protracted IDEA dispute should result from a 
legitimate disagreement about the needs of the student, not 
conflicting interpretations regarding the wording of a 
settlement offer.  Indeed, ten-day offers should foster 
discussion, which hopefully will often lead to the prompt 
resolution of IDEA disputes without the need for due process 
hearings or litigation.  This purpose is not served, however, 
when parties treat terse or inexact offers as non-negotiable.  In 
those circumstances, the parties potentially prolong the dispute 
unnecessarily, for they risk losing sight of what is most 
important: ensuring that the child gets the educational services 
needed.  Had the parties in this case communicated more 
effectively, the dispute very well could have been resolved far 
earlier and with the expenditure of fewer public funds.  My 
hope is that parties in these types of actions shall, in the future, 
heed this caveat.   
